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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Parent & Child - Restitution - Obligation of Child to Reimburse
State for Institutionalizing Indigent Parent -Plaintiff, a state agency,
brought an action to recover on a bond of Alfred and Ervin Schmidt
and their wives guaranteeing the support, care, and maintenance of the
named defendant's mother, which bond was executed in consideration
of the mother's transfer of certain property to defendants. The theory
under which recovery was sought was that the agency, by supplying
support and maintenance in the form of institutionalization, became a
third party beneficiary under the bond. Held: The obligation created
by the bond of defendants was personal to their mother with no pro-
vision therein to create any obligation or to secure benefits to any
third parties, consequently, the state agency not being a party to the
bond cannot recover thereunder. State Department of Public Welfare
v. Schmidt et al. 39 N.W. (2d) 392 (Wisconsin 1949).
That the state agency was properly denied recovery on a cause of
action founded on the theory that it was a third party beneficiary to
the bond must be conceded. However the facts of the case lend them-
selves to speculation as to whether the agency might not have fared
more favorably by basing the action on the theory of quasi contract.
In such an action the disposition of the case would necessarily revolve
about the question, "Did the state confer a benefit upon the defen-
dants ?". Simple though this question seems it conceals a labyrinth of
intricate problems concerning primarily the duty a child owes a parent
to support him when the parent becomes incompetent while indigent,
and secondly the element present in this type of litigation which con-
siders the support and care of incompetents a statutory obligation of
the state1 which obligation is classified more in the nature of a public
safety precaution than as a mere benefit to the person or persons di-
rectly benefited in a pecuniary manner.2 Thirdly, the question of
whether or not the state agency is precluded from this type of recovery
because of the statutory nature of its duty of support and is consequent
limitation to the statutory means of enforcing the personal obligation,
also statutory, of the child under these conditions.3 Although the third
of these three points will be seen to be controlling upon further de-
velopment it is nevertheless interesting to note that the same result will
follow from a development of the first two.
First, under the facts here involved, does the child owe a duty of
support? It is generally acknowledged that no such duty exists at
1 State Department of Public Welfare v. Shirley, 243 Wis. 276, 289, 10 N.W. 2d
215, 221 (1943) ; Patrick v. Baldwin, 109 Wis. 342, 85 N.W. 274 (1901) ; see
Coffeen v. Preble, 142 Wis. 183, 125 N.W. 954 (1910).
2 Richardson et al. v. Stuesser, 125 Wis. 66, 103 N.W. 261 (1905).
3 Town of Saxville v. Bartlett, 126 Wis. 655, 105 N.W. 1052 (1906).
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common law.4 Statutory law in Wisconsin has created a duty,5 but has
done so in a merely prospective manner. 6 Thus the legal obligation
may be said to be nonexistent until the legal machinery for fixing that
obligation is set in motion by proper court action and becomes fixed.
This result particularly follows the long line of decisions requiring
strict construction of rights and duties created by statute and the ne-
cessity for strict adherance to the enabling legislation for the beneficiary
of the statute to avail himself of its bounty.7 Thus, until the machinery
provided by statute by which the state can impose the obligation of
support on the child is utilized, can it be said that the state is conferring
any legal benefit upon the child, who until that time owes no legal duty
of support, by merely caring for a legal stranger to the child?
Secondly, in husband-wife cases, where the duty of support by the
husband is acknowledged by both common and statutory law, in con-
tradistinction to the child-parent support relationship, the courts take
a dim view of institutionalization of the wife as a benefit to the hus-
band. True their reasoning is prejudiced by the fact that institution-
alization removes the wife from the home established by the husband.9
But, when the courts take the view that a benefit does not exist even
when the husband is the moving party in incompetancy proceedings,
basing their decision on the premise that the incompetency is beyond
the power of the husband to prevent or acquiesce in, 0 the public pro-
tection phase of the state's action is obviously paramount and control-
ling, and the pecuniary benefit to the husband incomplete and incidental.
Applying this same line of reasoning to the child-parent relationship
must lead to the same result.
The third phase of the question of quasi contractual recovery, that
of whether or not the remedy is open to the state, is squarely met in
Town of Saxville v. Bartlett where the court specifically states that
since the state's right to reimbursement for care of incompetents is
statutory and unknown to the common law, the remedy therein pro-
vided is exclusive. The statutory remedy"I provides for the state
agency fixing support liability thru judgment, but such duty is not im-
446 C. J. p. 1279 sec. 73.
5 Wis. Stat. 49.07.6 Supra note 3.
7 Ibid at page 658 "This is plainly a case where a new right has been created
and a complete remedy for its enforcement has been provided with it. The
law is well settled that in such a case the remedy provided is exclusive." The
court then cites Hall v. Hinckley, 32 Wis. 362 (1873); State ex rel. Cook v.
Houser, 122 Wis. 534, 595, 100 N.W. 964, 984 (1904), and is itself cited with
approval in State Department of Public Welfare v. Shirley, supra note 1.
8 30 C.J. p. 516, sec. 29.
9 Supra note 2.
10 Ibid.
11 Supra note 5.
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posed until the commencement of the action and any action based on
past care furnished must fail.12
As the above discussion precludes the possibility of state recovery
for past care of indigent incompetents, it is appropriate now to consider
the course of action provided by statute 3 to which the state is limited
and in which the responsible family members, consisting of the father,
mother, husband, wife and children of the dependent, shall have their
liability fixed. The authorities having charge of the dependent person
or the board in charge of the institution where the dependent person
may be, must apply to the county judge of the county in which the de-
pendent person resides for an order to compel maintenance and must
serve a notice of such application upon the responsible family members
at least ten (10) days before a hearing which the county judge must
hold to hear the allegations and proofs in the matter. The county judge
will then, by order, require maintenance from such relatives, if they be
of sufficient ability, in the following order: first the husband or wife;
then the father; then the children; and lastly the mother. The order
will fix a weekly or monthly sum sufficient for the support of the de-
pendent to be paid for a fixed period or until further order of the court.
In the event that any responsible relative is unable wholly to maintain
the dependent, but is able to contribute to such support, the judge may
order two or more responsible relatives to maintain the dependent and
specify the amount each shall contribute. If it be established that the
responsible relatives are unable to wholly maintain the dependent but
are able to contribute to such maintenance, the judge shall order a sum
to be paid weekly or monthly by each relative in proportion to his abil-
ity. These orders may be enforced by proceedings as for contempt.
Also, the state is safe in furnishing maintenance once the order has
been made because the statute authorizes suit against any person dis-
obeying such an order and recovery in the amount prescribed by the
order. ELWIN J. ZARWELL
Taxation - Requirement that an Ordinary and Necessary Business
Expense Must Be Reasonable - Taxpayer, a manufacturing corporation,
deducted premiums paid on an employees' retirement annuity policy
and contributions to a trust fund for employees' benefit from its gross
income for 1940 and 1941 as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense.' The Tax Court disallowed this deduction ruling that the pay-
12 Guardianship of Heck, 225 Wis. 636, 275 N.W. 520 (1937).
13 Supra note 5.
1 Sec. 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code. It was conceded that the
payments were not qualified for deduction under Sec. 23 (p) as then in effect
which allowed deductions for payments to pension and other plans under
certain conditions.
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